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EU Member States’ Voting for Authorizing Genetically Engineered Crops: a Regulatory 1 
Gridlock 2 
Abstract 3 
Several authors suggest a gridlock of the European Union’s (EU’s) approval process for genetically 4 
engineered (GE) crops. We analyse the voting behaviour of EU Member States (MSs) for voting 5 
results from 2003 to 2015 on the approval of GE crops to test for a gridlock; no reliable data are 6 
available pre-2003—a time which included the EU’s moratorium on GE crops. After the European 7 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has given a favourable opinion on the safety of a GE crop, the Standing 8 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH) votes on the application. If SCFCAH 9 
reaches no decision, the Appeal Committee (AC) (pre the Treaty of Lisbon: the Council) votes on the 10 
application; if no decision is reached here, the final decision is left to the European Commission. All 11 
EU Member States (MSs) are represented on both committees; decisions are made by a qualified 12 
majority (QM) voting system, the rules of which have changed over time. Our data include 50 events; 13 
and 61 ballots at SCFCAH and 57 ballots Council / AC. A QM has been achieved once only at 14 
SCFCAH, but never at Council. At Council / AC level, Austria and Croatia have consistently voted 15 
against an approval, while The Netherlands has always supported approvals. All other MSs showed 16 
differences in their voting decisions at SCFCAH and Council / AC level at least once.  MS fixed 17 
effects are the major factor explaining the voting results supporting the gridlock hypothesis, while 18 
crop characteristics and crop use play no apparent role in MSs' voting behaviour. We postulate a QM 19 
is unlikely following the latest directive for MSs to ‘opt-out’ on GE crop cultivation in their territories. 20 
 21 
Key words: EU Member States, qualified majority vote, voting behaviour, Standing Committee on the 22 
Food Chain and Animal Health, Appeal Committee, Council, genetically engineered crop, political 23 
economy, opt-out. 24 
 25 
Das Abstimmungsverhalten von EU Mitgliedsstaaten hinsichtlich genetisch veränderten Anbaukulturen: ein 26 
regulatorischer Stillstand 27 
Zusammenfassung 28 
Einige wissenschaftliche Autoren berichten, dass das Genehmigungsverfahren für genetisch veränderte Anbaukulturen in der 29 
Europäischen Union ins Stocken geraten sei. Wir untersuchen das Abstimmungsverhalten und die Abstimmungsergebnisse von EU 30 
Mitgliedsstaaten im Rahmen dieser Genehmigungsverfahren im Zeitraum 2003 bis 2015, um diesen „Stau“ zu erforschen; für den 31 
Zeitraum vor 2003 liegen u.a. aufgrund des EU Moratoriums keine verlässlichen Daten vor. Nachdem die Europäische Behörde für 32 
Lebensmittelsicherheit (EFSA) neue Anbaukulturen für sicher befunden hat, stimmen Mitglieder des Ständigen Ausschusses für die 33 
Lebensmittelkette und die Tiergesundheit (SCFCAH) über deren Zulassung ab. Sollte in diesem Ausschuss keine Entscheidung 34 
hinsichtlich einer Deregulierung getroffen werden, so stimmt der Berufungsausschuss (Appeal Committee bzw. The Council) über 35 
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die Regulierung ab; sollte auch hier keine Entscheidung gefällt werden, liegt die endgültige Entscheidung bei der Europäischen 36 
Kommission. In beiden Ausschüssen sind alle EU Mitgliedsstaaten vertreten; Entscheidungen sind einer qualifizierten Mehrheit 37 
unterworfen, wobei die entsprechenden Regeln im Zeitverlauf geändert wurden. 38 
Unser Datensatz erstreckt sich auf 50 Anbaukulturen, über die in 61 Abstimmungen durch SCFCAH und in 57 Abstimmungen durch 39 
den Berufungsausschuss befunden wurde. Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass eine qualifizierte Mehrheit lediglich in einem einzigen Fall in 40 
einer SCFCAH Abstimmung, aber nie im Berufungsausschuss erreicht wurde. Bei Abstimmungen im Berufungsausschuss stimmten 41 
Österreich und Kroatien durchweg gegen eine Deregulierung, während die Niederlande alle Anträge unterstützten. Alle anderen 42 
Mitgliedsstaaten wiesen nicht immer ein konsistentes Abstimmungsverhalten in SCFCAH und dem Berufungsausschuss auf. Die 43 
Resultate unserer empirischen Analyse legen nahe, dass Ländereffekte den größten Erklärungsanteil für den genannten „Stau“ 44 
ausmachen; Eigenschaften einer Anbaukultur und deren Verwendungszweck scheinen lediglich eine untergeordnete Rolle für die 45 
Entscheidungen der Mitgliedsstaaten zu spielen. Eine qualifizierte Mehrheit erscheint unwahrscheinlich angesichts der jüngsten 46 
Direktive, die Mitgliedsstaaten erlaubt, auf ihrem jeweiligen Staatsgebiet den Anbau von genetisch veränderten Anbaukulturen zu 47 
untersagen. 48 
  49 
Stichwörter: EU Mitgliedsstaaten, qualifizierte Mehrheit, Abstimmungsverhalten, Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 50 
Animal Health, Appeal Committee, Council, genetisch veränderte Anbaukulturen, Politische Ökonomie, opt-out.  51 
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1 Introduction 52 
The advancement of scientific discovery gave rise to the development of recombinant DNA 53 
technology (genetic engineering), which has been successfully applied, inter alia, in plant breeding for 54 
developing genetically engineered (GE) crops (WESSELER, 2014). Scientists recognised the far-55 
reaching significance of this development, including potential risks and benefits, and consequently 56 
initiated steps for the regulation of this type of biotechnology research in the 1970s (MCHUGHEN and 57 
SMYTH, 2008). Regulatory oversight was broadened to include its commercial application for ensuring 58 
safety for humans and the environment (JAFFE, 2004). MORRIS and SPILLANE (2010) summarise the 59 
regulatory history in the European Union (EU) of this technology up to 2010, commenting that its 60 
development has been controversial and difficult. It was interrupted by a de facto moratorium from 61 
1998 to 2004, and the redrafting of legislation. In April of 2015 a legislative act was introduced 62 
whereby Member States (MSs) can decide whether GE crops authorised for cultivation can be 63 
cultivated on their territories (OJEU, 2015), the so-called ‘opt-out’ directive. Subsequently, a similar 64 
proposal for GE crops authorised for ‘food and feed’ use was made by the Commission (EC, 2015).  65 
 66 
The precautionary principle is the legal instrument used in the EU legislation for preventing and 67 
managing risk—connected in the food sector to biotechnology in a multidimensional way via science, 68 
ethics, sociology, and religion—thereby treating GE organisms as unique, requiring tailor-made 69 
regulations  (CARARU, 2009). Thus in the EU the process of genetic modification is regulated, and not 70 
the product (i.e. in the case of GE crops, the new genetic trait introduced to the plant). This means that 71 
every GE crop is subjected to regulatory oversight on a case-by-case approach (CARARU, 2009; 72 
TWARDOWSKI and MAŁYSKA, 2015) despite numerous high profile sources in the 1980s advocating 73 
that regulations in the EU be “product” rather than “process” based (MORRIS and SPILLANE 2010). 74 
One has to note, as BECKMANN ET AL. (2011) among others have pointed out, what is considered to be 75 
GE, conventional, or organic, is a social construct.  76 
 77 
The approval processes for GE crops in the EU and other countries have been criticized for their weak 78 
scientific support and welfare losses including health costs, and costs to the environment caused by 79 
delays in, or lack of, approval (FALCK-ZEPEDA ET AL., 2013). The temporal disparity in regulatory 80 
harmony has resulted in asynchronous approval causing disruptions in international trade (STEIN AND 81 
RODRIGUEZ-CEREZO, 2010).  82 
 83 
The EU is dependent on the import of food and feed, especially sources of vegetable protein such as 84 
soybean, for its livestock industry (HENSELER ET AL., 2013; DE VISSER ET AL., 2014; DUNWELL, 2014; 85 
KALAITZANDONAKES ET AL., 2014). But its stringent rules on the low level (adventitious) presence of 86 
unauthorized GE crops in imported shipments of food and or feed have caused the segregation of 87 
supply chains with concomitant costs, and disrupted trade (PURNHAGEN AND WESSELER, 2015; 88 
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KALAITZANDONAKES ET AL., 2014; FAO, 2014). The consequences have been strained relations with 89 
its trading partners (in some instances escalating to tribunal action at the World Trade Organisation 90 
(DE VILLE, 2014; PUNT and WESSELER, 2015), and notable revenue losses to its feed industry 91 
(BROOKES, 2008). HENSELER, ET AL. (2013) show that a trade disruption of EU soy imports caused by 92 
asynchronous approvals could compromise the competitiveness of its livestock sector and jeopardize 93 
agricultural incomes and employment with bidirectional knock-on effects within affected value chains. 94 
The EU’s relatively unfavourable regulatory environment has led to innovators in the field of green 95 
biotechnology to relocate their research and development activities to countries with more 96 
accommodating regulatory oversight where the prospect of commercializing innovations is better. The 97 
result is a loss in human capital, expertise, investment and employment opportunities, and potential 98 
benefits from the commercialization of these products (TRAGER, 2012; DUNWELL, 2014; MALYSKA 99 
and TWARDOWSKI, 2014). 100 
 101 
Taking a closer look at the EU’s GE crop regulations reveals that authorisation is required for one or 102 
more of the following purposes: use as food and or feed; import for processing; and cultivation. 103 
Authorisation is governed by Directive 2001/18/EC (OJEU, 2001) and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 104 
(OJEU, 2003), is valid for ten years after which a renewal is required, and follows a consecutive two-105 
tier process starting with a risk assessment followed by risk management. The former comprises 106 
scientific investigations conducted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for determining a 107 
crop’s safety for humans and animals (applications for use as food and or feed, and or import for 108 
processing), and the environment (additionally for applications for cultivation). If EFSA’s opinion is 109 
favourable, the next step is risk management—a political decision-making process (EUROPEAN FOOD 110 
SAFETY AUTHORITY, 2013) during which MSs’ representatives vote at the EU for authorization 111 
(OJEU, 2001). 112 
 113 
After the EFSA completes its involvement in the risk assessment (which is criticised for ignoring any 114 
potential benefits (MORRIS and SPILLANE, 2010)) of a given GE crop’s application, its overall opinion 115 
of the crop’s safety is published in the EFSA Journal. Risk management is triggered when EFSA 116 
passes its favourable opinions on to the European Commission (EC) for adoption, which the latter uses 117 
for preparing a proposal called a draft decision. A body comprising representatives (national experts) 118 
from all MSs, the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH), then 119 
assesses the draft decision. Approval of the draft decision is put the vote via a qualified majority (QM) 120 
voting system (for an explanation of QM voting, see section 2.1 below) under Regulation 1829/2003 121 
(if submitted under Directive 2001/18, then by the Regulatory Committee) (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 122 
2015a). If the SCFCAH agrees with the EC’s draft decision (i.e. a QM is achieved), then the GE crop 123 
is authorised for the specific use/s applied for. However, if the SCFCAH rejects the draft decision (via 124 
a qualified minority) or expresses no opinion (a QM is not reached), the EC either amends its draft 125 
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decision and resubmits it to the SCFCAH or submits the original draft decision to the Appeal 126 
Committee (AC) for a decision. The AC affords MSs the opportunity for “a second discussion at a 127 
higher level of representation” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015b); comprises representatives from 128 
MSs; is chaired by the Commission; and uses QM voting. If the AC rejects the EC’s draft decision, 129 
authorisation is declined. If the AC expresses no opinion, the authorisation will be granted as the EC 130 
may then adopt the decision (Figure 1).  131 
 132 
The time taken for a GE crop’s application successfully passing through the political step of the 133 
overall authorization process is of socio-economic importance as the less time it takes, the sooner 134 
society can benefit from using it, i.e. the loss of foregone benefits will be reduced. Those losses can be 135 
substantial (WESSELER and ZILBERMAN, 2014; ZILBERMAN ET AL., 2015). A full consensus 136 
(unanimity) within the EU at MS level for authorizing GE crops has never been reached—an unusual 137 
result considering a high and stable level of consensus over time at Council level on other topics 138 
(JENSEN, 2010). So far, one GE crop has approval for cultivation in the EU and 61 GE crops for 139 
import and processing, while in the United States, 115 crops have been approved for cultivation as of 140 
2014. 141 
 142 
While a number of scholars have assessed consumer, farmer, and farm-level, coexistence and labelling 143 
issues for GE crops, the literature assessing the EU’s policy on approving these crops is limited. 144 
GRAFF ET AL. (2009) explain the low number of approvals by political economy factors whereby the 145 
political economy forces opposing the approval of GE crops are stronger in the EU than in other 146 
countries. It would be expected that these forces would have weakened with time here, tempered by 147 
the positive experiences of the technology in other regions and the catching-up of the European plant 148 
breeding and chemical industry on the technology. As SWINNEN and VANDEMOORTELE (2010) argue, 149 
a change in voting behaviour, not to mention a change in regulation, will become more difficult once a 150 
regulation has been in place. The forces establishing a policy gridlock (VOGEL, 2003) are further 151 
strengthened if the uncertainty about the political outcome of a change in policy is strengthened 152 
(WESSELER and ZILBERMAN, 2014). 153 
 154 
In this contribution we report and analyse the voting results for approving GE crops from 2003 to 155 
2015 at the SCFCAH, and the Council and the Appeal Committee (C/AC), respectively. Reliable 156 
voting data pre-2003 (also a time during which the moratorium also occurred) were unavailable. 157 
 158 
We use the voting results to test whether or not individual MS characteristics are more relevant for 159 
explaining the voting behaviour supporting the aforementioned argument of a policy gridlock (VOGEL, 160 
2003, SWINNEN and VANDEMOORTELE, 2010) than other factors such as the crop type, e.g. maize or 161 
oilseed rape, or the transgenic trait, e.g. insect resistance or herbicide tolerance. Our investigation does 162 
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not, however, attempt at identifying and testing which MS characteristics, if any, can be used to 163 
explain voting behaviour as MÜHLBÖCK and TOSUN (2015) have done. Further, we use the results 164 
to identify possibilities for achieving a QM in favour of approval, i.e. which MSs would need to 165 
change their voting behaviour, and discuss the results in light of the Directive (EU) 215/412 for MSs 166 
to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GE crops in their territories—the ‘opt-out’ directive (OJEU, 167 
2015)1—as a change in regulation to overcome the policy gridlock.  168 
 169 
Our analysis shows that a MS’s identity (i.e. endogenous factors) and not specific characteristics of the 170 
GE crop is statistically the most significant factor driving voting behaviour, putting into question the 171 
success of the ‘opt-out’ proposal to overcome the policy gridlock. 172 
 173 
2 The Voting Process in the EU for Authorizing GE Plants 174 
2.1 Qualified Majority Voting 175 
The number of MSs comprising the EU has increased since its inception (originally known as the 176 
European Economic Community: ECC) from six core states to 15—when GE crops first appeared in 177 
the mid-1990s—to the current 28. Each MS’s vote is weighted according to its population (with the 178 
less-populous states having a proportionally larger weighting). A QM is achieved when the number of 179 
votes cast (‘for’ or ‘against’) equal or exceed a threshold value calculated as a percentage of the 180 
maximum possible number of votes. Threshold values and the vote weights for individual MSs have 181 
changed over time (see Table 1 and its footnotes) (European Commission, 2013).  182 
 183 
We give our mathematical description of the QM voting as follows: 184 
 185 
At any given time, the EU MSs comprise a set N denoted i. 186 
 187 
We denote the votes of MS i as 𝑉𝑖: 188 
 189 
𝑉𝑖 = {
1
0 
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑆𝑖 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 ′𝑓𝑜𝑟′
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑆𝑖 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑢𝑡 ′𝑓𝑜𝑟
′𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤
 190 
 191 
𝑉𝑖 = 0 if a MS i votes ‘against’ including any form of ‘against’ (i.e. an abstention, or absent from the 192 
ballot). 193 
 194 
Each MS i, has a vote weight, wi 195 
 196 
For each ballot, the total number of ‘for’ votes, Q is calculated as follows 197 
                                                 
1 We concentrate on achieving a QM in favour of approval as this has been the objective for revising the legal 
framework. 
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 198 
𝑄 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑉𝑖
𝑖𝜖𝑁
. 199 
 200 
A positive decision (i.e. approval) is reached if 𝑄 ≥ 𝑡, where 𝑡 is the QM threshold value of ‘for’ votes 201 
for a given decision (ballot). For the period 1 December 2007 to 30 June 2013, for example, a decision 202 
required at least 255 votes (73.91%) out of the 345 total, for adoption (Table 1). The weighting 203 
arrangements are the result of a compromise reached between MSs in a “degressively proportional 204 
system” where smaller and larger MSs are over- and under-represented, respectively—a compromise 205 
reached between federalist and intergovernmental elements within the EU of the ‘one man, one vote’ 206 
and ‘one country, one vote’ principles, respectively (MOBERG, 1998: 350). The current weighting of 207 
votes, enshrined in The Treaty of Nice, came into force on 1 November 2004. Subsequently, The 208 
Treaty of Lisbon (Article 16 of the Treaty on EU) introduced a new definition for the rule of QM with 209 
a three-stage implementation (for details, see Table 2). 210 
 211 
MS voting is a continuous process involving strategy and “a stream of interconnected decisions” 212 
where synergies and opportunities are sought for initiating so-called package deals. MSs practice vote 213 
trading and log-rolling (exchange of political favours) while they simultaneously defend national 214 
interests and promote common European ones. Occasionally domestic pressure is too high for 215 
sustaining this balancing strategy (TRZASKOWSKI, 2009). Thus decision making is a bargaining act 216 
(MOBERG, 2007) where reciprocity is likely (JENSEN, 2010). It is therefore evident that voting takes 217 
place in a complex environment in which many interactions play a role in each ballot’s result, 218 
including MSs bargaining with lobbyists (e.g. the GE crop and nuclear energy trade-off between 219 
France and ecologists (FICEK, 2013)).  220 
 221 
Scholars have assessed the ramifications of various voting arrangements for, inter alia, ‘balance’ or 222 
fairness and tactical arrangements amongst voters such as forming coalitions (PENROSE, 1946; 223 
BANZHAF III, 1964; COLEMAN, 1971; FELSENTHAL and MACHOVER, 2000; LEECH, 2002; ALONSO-224 
MEIJIDE, ET AL., 2009; PLECHANOVOVÁ, 2011). SLOMCZYNSKI and ZYCZKOWSKI (2006) comment that 225 
analysing coalition formations is highly complex for the EU—demonstrated by the high number (134 226 
mill.) of possible coalitions possible for the EU-27—and show that the difficulty of forming winning 227 
coalitions is positively correlated with membership number. 228 
 229 
2.2 Description of the Data Set 230 
We sourced our data from two publications: AgraFacts and AgraFocus (see 231 
http://www.agrafacts.com/Home.html), which published most of the voting results for the SCFCAH 232 
and the Council and AC for the period December 2003 to January 2015; no reliable data were 233 
available for earlier ballots, and little voting took place during the moratorium. We captured the ballot 234 
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results in the following categories for the aforementioned voting bodies: ‘for’; ‘against’; ‘abstain’; and 235 
pooled the results for ‘absent’, ‘no representative’, and ‘no position taken due to “parliamentary 236 
reserve”’, and ‘no result published’ as ‘no vote cast’ because of their infrequent occurrence and their 237 
failure to contribute to a QM. 238 
 239 
The EU’s membership has grown over time. Therefore the number of voting opportunities per MS is a 240 
function of: (1) how long it has been a member of the EU, and (2) the number of ballots during its 241 
membership. Generally, the longer a MS has been a member, the higher the number of voting 242 
opportunities. The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, the UK, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, and 243 
Spain; and Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, Hungary, Cyprus, and Lithuania voted ‘for’ and ‘against’, 244 
respectively, with a frequency of at least 80%; Italy, France, Bulgaria, and Ireland abstained at least 245 
40% of the time at the SCFCAH. Finland and The Netherlands always voted ‘for’, and Austria always 246 
‘against’, at both the SCFCAH and the C/AC. Croatia, Luxembourg, and Latvia never voted ‘for’ at 247 
the C/AC (Figures 2 and 3). 248 
 249 
The data summarised in Figures 4 and 5 essentially represent the binary outcome of each ballot. 250 
However, the weighted outcome is the important result of each voting event as this determines 251 
whether or not a QM vote is achieved. We applied the weights given in Table 1 to each successive 252 
ballot at the SCFCAH and the C/AC, and calculated the minimum number of additional ‘for’ votes 253 
needed for a QM (last column in Tables A1 and A2).  254 
 255 
2.3 Empirical Analysis of the Voting Data 256 
The SCFACH represents the first step in the political decision-making process. Should MSs not vote 257 
in favour of an application here, the political process continues with the Commission becoming 258 
involved as shown in Figure 1. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 indicate that the voting 259 
behaviour of the SCFCAH and the C/AC is similar (see also Figures 4 and 5). 260 
 261 
We treated every ‘for’ vote as a positive statement for supporting a GE crop’s authorization. The 262 
‘against’ and ‘abstain’ votes, and several forms of absenteeism were interpreted as negative statements 263 
opposing authorization as they prevented a QM (JENSEN, 2010). 264 
 265 
We used odds ratios in a set of logistic regressions for testing whether a MS’s identity, an applicant’s 266 
domicile, and a crop plant’s genetic trait are suitable explanatory variables for explaining a MS’s 267 
voting decision. This was done by first testing a MS’s identity, and then stepwise adding additional 268 
explanatory variables. The rationale for using this method is to assess whether voting decisions can be 269 
explained by factors associated with a MS’s characteristics (i.e. endogenous factors), or whether MS-270 
specific effects prevail if explanatory variables based on qualitative information (e.g. crop type, or the 271 
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crop’s intended use) are added to the model. Theoretically, what appears to be a MS-specific effect 272 
may in fact reflect a MS-specific concern or opportunity leading respectively to a negative or positive 273 
vote. For example, Scandinavian MSs tend to accept (vote ‘for’) GE crops, but it is unknown whether 274 
these MSs’ voting behaviour is related to liberal and open-minded societies, or whether their positive 275 
votes are associated with, for example, factors favouring these MSs’ bio-economies (agricultural and 276 
biotech sectors). We use a set of logistic regression models for disentangling these factors and for 277 
testing if they can be used for explaining the variation in voting behaviour. 278 
 279 
The equation below illustrates our estimation strategy for testing the relationship between a positive 280 
vote and a set of explanatory factors, where μ represents a binary variable that is one for a positive 281 
vote of MS i, at time t, for crop j, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is assumed to be a 282 
function of MS fixed effects (C) that are included to reflect MS-specific voting patterns. The vector X 283 
includes controls for plant-related features such as type of trait, plant type, intended crop use, and the 284 
developer’s (applicant) domicile. We aim at capturing a time trend (T) to observe any temporal 285 
changes in voting pattern; α and ε represent a constant and the error term, respectively. 286 
 287 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ C + 𝛽2 ∗ X + 𝛽3 ∗ T + 𝜀 288 
 289 
Regression models 1 to 8 in Table 3 analyse MSs’ voting at the C/AC, which is politically more 290 
important than the SCFCAH (Table 4) (EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2015b). Model 1 only controls for MS 291 
fixed-effects, reflecting general voting behaviour. For example, the coefficient for the voting 292 
behaviour of Finland and Sweden reflects an accepting (positive) attitude towards GE crops contrasted 293 
by Cyprus’ voting indicating the opposite sentiment. Italy was chosen as a reference category because 294 
its voting behaviour was the most dynamic (i.e. changed its position the most) of the ‘heavy-weight’ 295 
MSs. In subsequent models we added explanatory variables, which may: (1) help explain results 296 
represented in model 1, (2) add more statistical explanatory power, and (3) test the robustness of initial 297 
results. For example, in model 2, we added a metric variable capturing a time trend; results indicate 298 
that with time EU MSs have become more likely to vote positively. In model 3 we added controls for a 299 
GE crop’s intended use (import; or food or feed; or cultivation), which turned out to be statistically 300 
unimportant. However, this finding needs to be contextualized: the number of applications for 301 
cultivation is very low. Similarly, we found no robust evidence for differences between multiple- and 302 
single trait crops, or crops engineered for herbicide tolerance or insect resistance, respectively (models 303 
4 and 5). In models 7 and 8 we tested the influence of plant type on voting behaviour. Our results 304 
suggest that MSs were most in favour of GE flowers (a flower’s petal colour was altered) and least in 305 
favour of GE oilseed rape. 306 
 307 
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Most importantly however, we observed no substantial changes in the coefficients reflecting MS-fixed 308 
effects. MSs’ voting decisions can neither be explained by crop type nor a developers’ domicile. 309 
Foreign-based developers were involved with 62 and 65% of the votes at SCFCAH and the C/AC, 310 
respectively. It seems that the factors influencing voting decisions are related to a MS’s endogenous 311 
characteristics, which is supported by the explanatory power of our models: controlling for MS-fixed 312 
effects only, gave a pseudo-R² of 0.44. By adding the full set of explanatory variables available 313 
increases this metric marginally to 0.47, an unimportant difference (Table 2). MÜHLBÖCK and TOSUN 314 
(2015) found that voting patterns on GE crops at Council are influenced by (1) national interests: 315 
expressed via a combination of public opinion (public fear of genetically modified organisms); “issue 316 
salience” (agriculture’s share of total employment); and lobbying against genetically modified 317 
organisms (share of organic farming); and (2) ideology (i.e. the political party family the responsible 318 
minister voting belonged to).  319 
 320 
We repeated the above analysis for votes cast at the SCFCAH. Our results (Table 3) confirmed earlier 321 
findings regarding the importance of a MS’s identity for explaining vote polarity. Coefficients 322 
reflecting MS-fixed effects are similar in magnitude to the corresponding models in Table 2, and they 323 
are very robust (including additional explanatory variables had a negligible effect in terms of effect 324 
size and pseudo-R2 values). MS-fixed effects alone account for 45% of the explanatory power of the 325 
basic model; all additional qualitative models add a mere four percentage points (pseudo R² of 0.49 in 326 
model 16, Table 3). We found a positive and statistically significant time trend in the likelihood for 327 
positive votes. GE crops intended for cultivation appear to have gained less support for authorization 328 
at the SCFCAH than at the C/AC. This is supported by the fact that only one GE crop has been 329 
approved for cultivation, but very few applications have been submitted for this use category (i.e. 330 
statistically a low number of observations). 331 
 332 
There is marginal evidence for supporting imported GE crops, but this observation is neither robust 333 
nor consistently statistically significant. We also found evidence that at the SCFCAH caution was 334 
exercised for authorizing the following crops: oilseed rape, cotton, maize, and soybean.  335 
 336 
We ran a set of robustness tests addressing the changes in the EU’s growing membership over time. 337 
During the period under observation (2003 to 2015), the EU’s membership grew by 13, potentially 338 
giving rise to a systematic change in voting outcomes. We addressed this issue by using a set of 339 
regressions that were identical to the aforementioned ones using 15 ‘core’ MSs instead of the full 340 
panel of 282. The results confirmed earlier findings: MS-fixed effects are virtually identical and 341 
pseudo R² computations indicate that these MS-fixed effects explain 29% of votes alone. Additional 342 
explanatory variables increase this metric by nine percentage points. For the 15 ‘core’ members, we 343 
                                                 
2 These results are not reported, but available on request from the authors. 
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found a positive time trend for the C/AC and the SCOFCAH, as well as negative sentiments towards 344 
approvals for the cultivation of GE crops (SCFCAH only) and generally weaker support for GE 345 
oilseed rape.  346 
 347 
Therefore the current voting mechanism, despite the voting gridlock, allows for the importation of 348 
certain GE crops as food and or feed. Its slowness contributes to approval asynchrony. Developers 349 
avoid applying for authorisation to cultivate GE crops in the EU. Unity in the EU concerning the 350 
approval of GE crops for their various uses, is lacking. Research is required for finding possible 351 
mechanisms for breaking the gridlock so that those MSs wishing to gain from using these innovations 352 
earlier, can do so. 353 
 354 
3 Voting Gridlock on GE Crops 355 
A decision by QM vote for the authorization of GE crops in the EU has been reached once; for all 356 
other ballots there was a consistent ‘no opinion’ i.e. a QM was not reached (Figures 4 and 5). This 357 
relentless deadlock has contributed to the slowness of the authorization process, and hence approval 358 
asynchronicity. We are interested to know if there are any MSs who have persistently contributed to 359 
this trend. Is a there a way out of this regulatory gridlock? 360 
 361 
We assume that each MS cast its ballot independently—uninfluenced by exogenous factors3. The only 362 
positive contribution towards achieving a QM is a ‘for’ vote. We therefore scrutinized each ballot for 363 
all MSs that prevented a QM, namely those who voted: ‘against’, abstained, or who were absentees. 364 
From this subset of voters, we found (1) the minimum number of MSs needed to achieve a QM, and 365 
(2) who they were. Continuing with our previous mathematical notation: without loss of generality, we 366 
ordered members of set N according to their vote weights, i.e.,  367 
 368 
𝑤𝑖 ≥ 𝑤𝑗 ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝑁 369 
 370 
The minimum number required for a QM, M, is calculated as follows: 371 
 372 
𝑀 = 𝑡 − 𝑄 373 
 374 
MSs who voted anything but ‘for’ (i.e. all forms of ‘against’ as previously explained) comprise A, 375 
which is a subset of N such that: 376 
 377 
𝐴: {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁|𝑉𝑖 = 0} 378 
                                                 
3 Note: the formation of coalitions and other tactics influencing a ballot’s outcome do not form part of 
this study and are investigated in on-going research on the topic. 
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 379 
Now find the minimum subset R of A that satisfies the following condition 380 
 381 
∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖𝜖𝑅
≥ 𝑀, 382 
 383 
for finding the voters who prevented a QM. 384 
 385 
In practise, we sequentially added these MSs’ votes until a QM could theoretically have been 386 
achieved. When counting the number of MSs in this subset for ballots where more than one MS of 387 
equal rank (vote weight) could have contributed to the total, we counted them all (consistent with our 388 
assumption of independence). For example, consider the SCFCAH ballot for Monsanto’s oilseed rape 389 
MON88302 on 24.10.2014. 390 
 391 
Total number of ‘for’ votes, Q = 140; with t = 260. Thus M = 120. 392 
 393 
The following MSs comprised subset A (i.e. all MSs who did not vote ‘for’), in descending order (vote 394 
weight in parenthesis): France (29); Germany (29); Italy (29); Poland (27); Greece (12); Hungary (12); 395 
Austria (10); Bulgaria (10); Sweden (10); Croatia (7); Cyprus (7); Denmark (7); Lithuania (7); 396 
Slovakia (7); Latvia (4); Slovenia (4); Luxembourg (4); and Malta (3) (AF, 2014:2). The sum of the 397 
votes for the first four voters is 114. A minimum of six more votes is needed for a QM, i.e. for t to be 398 
reached. The next candidate in alphabetical order is Greece with 12 votes, but Hungary has the same 399 
weight, therefore both MSs are chosen as potential contributors for reaching a QM. We computed the 400 
frequency with which MSs’ negative votes could have contributed to achieving a QM for the six 401 
periods shown in Table 4. The results reported includes a bias towards larger EU MSs, but can be 402 
justified as coalitions are easier to achieve with a lower number of participants.  403 
 404 
Table 5 shows six voting periods according to the number of EU MSs and EU voting rules. Columns 3 405 
to 6 show the relation between the number of ‘against’ votes in relation to the total number of votes. 406 
The MSs listed are those that would be needed for a QM. Germany for example, had a weight of 407 
11.49% (10 votes) in the first period, voting three times at the SCFCAH, always ‘against’. Germany 408 
was needed each time for achieving a qualified majority. Italy voted once ‘against’ in the same period 409 
and would have also been needed in that specific case for getting a QM. The other two times Italy 410 
voted ‘for’.  411 
 412 
Three of the four ‘heavy-weight’ MSs, namely, France, Germany, and Italy (UK is the fourth) feature 413 
prominently in preventing a QM. Since its accession to the EU in May 2004, Poland has become an 414 
important and consistent opponent (contributor to the ‘against’ vote) due to its sizable vote weight, 415 
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while Spain (Poland’s equal in vote weight (see Table 1)) switched to being a consistent supporter 416 
from 2007 onwards. Although the number of ballots with the latest double majority voting rule is low, 417 
early evidence reveals that the influence of Germany, France, and Italy—in this order—on achieving a 418 
QM has strengthened due to their new, larger vote weights (Table 4). 419 
 420 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 421 
Our statistical analysis shows that a MS’s identity (i.e. endogenous factors) is statistically the most 422 
significant factor driving voting behaviour. Other factors like a GE crop’s characteristics play an 423 
unimportant role (i.e., do not influence the voting outcome—all GE crops are seen in the same light) in 424 
explaining MS voting behaviour in the context of our study and assumptions. The country fixed effects 425 
are in the majority of the cases statistically significantly the most important factors explaining voting 426 
behaviour. This empirical finding supports the gridlock hypotheses. We also found an overall positive 427 
time trend suggesting a persistent, but slightly weakening, gridlock. We postulate that it is unlikely in 428 
the foreseeable future for this trend to persist to the point where a QM is reached. 429 
 430 
Results indicate that reaching a QM vote is unlikely due to the strong blocking effect of a few ‘heavy 431 
weight’ voters like France, Germany, Italy (LEECH, 2002), and more recently, Poland. The latest 432 
changes to the voting rules (double majority) mean that Germany has the strongest blocking power in 433 
the EU conferring it with significant leverage for concessions with other voters (MOBERG, 2007). 434 
 435 
The status quo of not reaching a QM is likely to persist unless the likes of Germany, France, and Italy 436 
collectively change their positions to a ‘for’ vote for supporting GE crops. The 2015 proposal by the 437 
EC for MSs to ‘opt-out’ from approvals for cultivation is designed in part to “improve the process of 438 
authorisations” (OJEU, 2015), i.e. facilitate an increase the number of GE crops authorised for 439 
cultivation in Union. According to our results, this outcome is unlikely as it would require more MSs 440 
to vote in favour of approval. This would require at least two of the three heavy weights in France, 441 
Germany, or Italy to change their latest voting behaviour. Importantly, it would require them to vote in 442 
favour of the most sensitive use category, namely cultivation. The strong policy signals from Germany 443 
and France against the cultivation of GE crops further supports our doubt that their voting behaviour 444 
will change in the foreseeable future. Italy might be the only ‘heavy weight’ most likely to change—445 
this is based on its historical voting behaviour and the demand by some of its “pro-biotech” farmers to 446 
access the technology (FLAK ET AL., 2013). Even if the ‘opt-out’ proposal does not result in a QM for 447 
approval, the time the EC takes after the voting at the AC might shorten as the EC might be under less 448 
pressure from MSs to delay a final decision, and can therefore justify accepting EFSA’s favourable 449 
opinions by indicating that MSs who had voted against cultivating GE crops in their countries had in 450 
fact ‘opted-out’ anyway.  451 
 452 
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The voting behaviour of the EU MSs for GE plants is well established and therefore unlikely to 453 
change much because green biotechnology is such a “controversial and value-loaded” issue 454 
(MÜHLBOCK and TOSUN, 2015). Why is it so controversial and value-loaded? More in-depth research 455 
is required to understand the MS endogenous factors driving voting behaviour such as: (1) the core 456 
reasons for each MS’s stance on GE plants, (2) the factors driving politicians’ voting behaviour, and 457 
(3) at MS-level, the link between the public’s stance on genetic engineering and the voting behaviour 458 
of its representatives at the Union. A reductionist approach is one avenue for future research to follow 459 
for revealing the underlying reasons for this voting gridlock. An improved understanding of the root 460 
causes of the gridlock has the potential for finding ways of alleviating the gridlock so that the costs 461 
caused by the current approval system will be reduced. 462 
 463 
Finally, political-economy factors of each MS that may play a role in their voting behaviour need to be 464 
investigated more deeply for providing an improved understanding of their voting behaviour. We 465 
suggest that further research test the hypothesis that in the EU the political-economic benefit-cost ratio 466 
is too low for politicians to vote in favour of approving GE crops.  467 
  468 
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Figure 1. Approval process in the EU for GE crops with a favourable EFSA opinion and a positive 597 
draft decision by the EC (modified from WESSELER and KALAITZANDONAKES (2011)). 598 
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Figure 2. The relative frequency of votes cast by MSs at the SCFCAH from December 2003 to 646 
December 2014 (MS abbreviations are listed in Table 1). On the vertical axis, the numbers in 647 
parentheses are the number of voting opportunities per MS. Note: “Absent” included no position taken 648 
due to parliamentary reserve. 649 
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Figure 3. The relative frequency of votes cast by MSs at the C/AC from May 2004 to February 2015 655 
(MS abbreviations are listed in see Table 1). On the vertical axis, the numbers in parentheses are the 656 
number of voting opportunities per MS. Note: “Absent” included no position taken due to 657 
parliamentary reserve. Because voting on the same GE crop takes place at the C/AC after the 658 
SCFCAH, our start and end date of 2004 and 2015, respectively, are each a year later than that for 659 
SCFCAH in Figure 2. 660 
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Figure 4. The total number of ‘for’ and ‘against’ votes cast at the SCFCAH expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible number of votes, according to 
each EU MS’s weight for ballots authorizing GE crops from December 2003 to December 2014 versus the QM threshold. 
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Figure 5. The total number of ‘for’ and ‘against’ votes cast at the C/AC expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible number of votes, according to each 
EU MS’s weight for ballots authorizing GE crops from 2004 to 2015 versus the QM threshold. 
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Table 1. Member States (MSs) of the European Union, year joined, and their vote weights for the QM 
voting system from 1995 to 2015. 
MS1 with official 
abbreviation 
Year 
joined1 
EU-15 (01.01.1995 
-  30.04.2004)1 
EU-25 
(01.05.2004 – 
31.10.2004)1 
EU-25 
(01.11.2004 -  
31.12.2006)1 
EU-27 
(01.12.2007 – 
30.06.2013)1 
EU-28 
(01.07.2013 – 
31.10.2013)1 
EU-28 
(from 
01.11.2014) (%) 
Austria (AT) 1995 4 4 10 10 10 1.67 
Belgium (BE) 1952 5 5 12 12 12 2.21 
Bulgaria (BG) 2007    10 10 1.44 
Croatia (HR) 2013     7 0.84 
Cyprus (CY) 2004  2 4 4 4 0.17 
Czech Rep. (CZ) 2004  5 12 12 12 2.08 
Denmark (DK) 1973 3 3 7 7 7 1.11 
Estonia (EE) 2004  3 4 4 4 0.26 
Finland (FI) 1995 3 3 7 7 7 1.07 
France (FR) 1952 10 10 29 29 29 12.98 
Germany (DE) 1952 10 10 29 29 29 15.93 
Greece (EL) 1981 5 5 12 12 12 2.19 
Hungary HU) 2004  5 12 12 12 1.96 
Ireland (Rep) (IE) 1973 3 3 7 7 7 0.91 
Italy (IT) 1952 10 10 29 29 29 11.81 
Latvia (LV) 2004  3 4 4 4 0.40 
Lithuania (LT) 2004  3 7 7 7 0.59 
Luxembourg 
(LU) 
1952 2 2 4 4 4 0.11 
Malta (MT) 2004  2 3 3 3 0.08 
Netherlands (NL) 1952 5 5 13 13 13 3.32 
Poland (PL) 2004  8 27 27 27 7.62 
Portugal (PT) 1986 5 5 12 12 12 2.07 
Romania (RO) 2007    14 14 3.97 
Slovakia (SK) 2004  3 7 7 7 1.07 
Slovenia (SI) 2004  3 4 4 4 0.41 
Spain (ES) 1986 8 8 27 27 27 9.24 
Sweden (SE) 1995 4 4 10 10 10 1.89 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 
1973 10 10 29 29 29 12.61 
 Total 87 124 321 345 352 100.01 
 Qualified Majority2 62 (71.26%) 88 (70.97%)  232 (72.27%) 255 (73.91%) 260 (73.91%) 65% 
16 MSs3 
 Qualified Minority2 26 37 90 91 93 35% 
 4 MSs4 
 
1 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004) 
2 A majority of the Member States must vote in favour when a proposal has been presented by the Commission, or two thirds of the Member 
States must vote in favour in all other cases. The qualified majority shall cover at least 62% of the EU’s population (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2004). 
3 A Qualified Majority is reached when 55% of MSs vote in favour (16 out of 28) and MSs representing at least 65% of the EU’s population 
(EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2015). 
4 A blocking minority must include at least four Council members representing more than 35% of the EU population (EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
2015).  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for voting results at SCFCAH and C/AC for authorizing GE crops in the 
EU (referring to models 8 and 16 from Tables 3 and 4, respectively). 
Parameter 
 
Voting Body 
SCFCAH C/AC 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Vote ‘for’ 0.44 0.5 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Year 2009.63 3.22 2003 2014 2009.8 3.26 2004 2015 
Import 0.65 0.48 0 1 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Food, feed 0.82 0.38 0 1 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Cultivation 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Multiple trait 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Single trait 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Herbicide tolerance 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Insect resistance 0.45 0.5 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Other 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Foreign (ex-European)1 0.62 0.48 0 1 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Domestic (European)1 0.38 0.48 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Cotton 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Flower 0.02 0.12 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Maize 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Oilseed rape 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Potato 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Rice 0.02 0.13 0 1 . . . . 
Soybean 0.21 0.40 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Sugarbeet 0.02 0.13 0 1 . . . . 
1 Applicant’s domicile 
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Table 3. Correlates of positive (‘for’) votes at the EU’s C/AC for authorizing GE crops from 2004 to 2015. 
Parameter 
Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: likelihood of ‘for’ vote at C\AC 
Member State 
  
AT omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
BE 3.51*** 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.61*** 3.61*** 3.62*** 3.74*** 3.75*** 
 (5.35) (5.46) (5.46) (5.47) (5.47) (5.48) (5.57) (5.57) 
BG 1.79*** 1.67** 1.67** 1.67** 1.67** 1.68** 1.70** 1.69** 
 (2.61) (2.42) (2.42) (2.41) (2.42) (2.43) (2.42) (2.41) 
CP -1.12 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.15 -1.15 
 (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
CZ 5.01*** 5.14*** 5.14*** 5.15*** 5.16*** 5.17*** 5.35*** 5.37*** 
 (6.83) (6.94) (6.95) (6.96) (6.96) (6.97) (7.10) (7.10) 
DE 2.79*** 2.85*** 2.85*** 2.86*** 2.86*** 2.87*** 2.96*** 2.96*** 
 (4.29) (4.36) (4.36) (4.36) (4.37) (4.37) (4.44) (4.44) 
DK 3.28*** 3.37*** 3.37*** 3.38*** 3.38*** 3.39*** 3.50*** 3.50*** 
 (5.03) (5.13) (5.13) (5.14) (5.14) (5.15) (5.23) (5.23) 
ES 3.43*** 3.52*** 3.53*** 3.53*** 3.53*** 3.54*** 3.66*** 3.66*** 
 (5.25) (5.35) (5.35) (5.36) (5.36) (5.37) (5.46) (5.46) 
EE 5.21*** 5.34*** 5.34*** 5.36*** 5.36*** 5.37*** 5.57*** 5.58*** 
 (6.90) (7.01) (7.01) (7.03) (7.03) (7.04) (7.17) (7.17) 
FI 5.78*** 5.93*** 5.93*** 5.95*** 5.95*** 5.96*** 6.16*** 6.19*** 
 (6.89) (7.02) (7.02) (7.04) (7.04) (7.05) (7.18) (7.19) 
FR 1.67** 1.70** 1.70** 1.70** 1.70** 1.71** 1.76** 1.76** 
 (2.49) (2.51) (2.51) (2.51) (2.52) (2.52) (2.56) (2.56) 
EL -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.00) 
HU -1.12 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.15 -1.15 
 (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
IE 3.07*** 3.15*** 3.15*** 3.15*** 3.15*** 3.16*** 3.27*** 3.27*** 
 (4.72) (4.80) (4.80) (4.81) (4.81) (4.82) (4.90) (4.90) 
IT reference reference reference reference reference reference reference reference 
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LV omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
LT -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.43 
 (-0.43) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) 
LU omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
MT 1.48** 1.49** 1.49** 1.50** 1.50** 1.50** 1.55** 1.54** 
 (2.17) (2.18) (2.18) (2.18) (2.18) (2.18) (2.22) (2.22) 
NL omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
PL -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.43 
 (-0.43) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.45) 
PT 4.11*** 4.23*** 4.23*** 4.24*** 4.24*** 4.25*** 4.40*** 4.41*** 
 (6.12) (6.24) (6.24) (6.25) (6.25) (6.26) (6.37) (6.37) 
RO 5.93*** 5.87*** 5.88*** 5.89*** 5.89*** 5.91*** 5.99*** 5.97*** 
 (6.34) (6.26) (6.26) (6.27) (6.28) (6.29) (6.32) (6.31) 
SI -1.12 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.15 -1.15 
 (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
SK 3.81*** 3.90*** 3.90*** 3.91*** 3.92*** 3.92*** 4.06*** 4.07*** 
 (5.74) (5.84) (5.84) (5.85) (5.85) (5.86) (5.97) (5.97) 
SE 4.86*** 4.99*** 5.00*** 5.01*** 5.01*** 5.02*** 5.20*** 5.21*** 
 (6.77) (6.90) (6.90) (6.92) (6.92) (6.93) (7.05) (7.05) 
UK 4.70*** 4.84*** 4.84*** 4.85*** 4.85*** 4.86*** 5.04*** 5.05*** 
 (6.67) (6.80) (6.80) (6.81) (6.82) (6.83) (6.94) (6.95) 
HR omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
          
Time trend 
Year   0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
   (4.90) (4.66) (4.70) (4.72) (4.57) (4.00) (3.94) 
GE crop’s use 
Import    -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.15 
    (-0.22) (0.10) (0.06) (0.29) (0.65) (0.61) 
Food, feed    reference reference reference reference reference reference 
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Cultivation    -0.32 0.00 -0.02 0.15 0.64 0.63 
    (-0.51) (0.00) (-0.04) (0.23) (0.73) (0.71) 
Trait multiple 
multiple      -0.10 -0.10 -0.22 -0.20 
      (-0.53) (-0.56) (-1.11) (-0.91) 
single      reference reference reference reference 
           
Type of GE trait 
Herbicide tolerance     -0.16 -0.13 -0.13  0.10 
     (-0.84) (-0.64) (-0.61)  (0.45) 
Insect resistance     reference reference reference  reference 
           
Other     -0.42 -0.41 -0.39  -0.49 
     (-1.56) (-1.51) (-1.45)  (-1.31) 
Developer's domicile 
Foreign (ex-Europe)       0.24 0.06 0.05 
       (1.37) (0.34) (0.27) 
Domestic (European)       reference reference reference 
           
Plant type 
  
Cotton        -0.17 -0.30 
        (-0.50) (-0.86) 
Flower        2.37*** 2.81*** 
        (3.22) (3.59) 
Maize        0.08 -0.05 
        (0.31) (-0.17) 
Oilseed rape        -1.10*** -1.09*** 
        (-3.29) (-3.20) 
Potato        -0.91 -0.49 
        (-1.40) (-0.70) 
Rice         omitted 
           
Soybean         omitted 
           
Sugarbeet         omitted 
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Constant -2.89*** -254.57*** -255.52*** -262.33*** -264.35*** -257.60*** -252.48*** -250.19*** 
 (-4.87) (-4.95) (-4.72) (-4.76) (-4.78) (-4.63) (-4.05) (-3.99) 
Pseudo R² 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Observations 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,276 
 
Note: Robust z-values in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. Dependent variable is the likelihood of "for" vote at C/AC. 
Some MSs’ voting behaviour cannot be assessed in the chosen framework since there is no “variation” in their votes, i.e. they consistently voted either ‘for’ or ‘against’.    
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Table 4. Correlates of positive (‘for’) votes at SCFCAH for authorizing GE crops in the EU from 2003 to 2014. 
Parameter 
Model 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of ‘for’ vote at SCOFCAH 
Member State 
  
AT omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
BE 2.85*** 2.88*** 2.91*** 2.92*** 2.92*** 2.92*** 3.16*** 3.17*** 
 (5.32) (5.36) (5.40) (5.40) (5.41) (5.41) (5.57) (5.58) 
BG 1.23** 1.15** 1.15** 1.15** 1.16** 1.16** 1.29** 1.29** 
 (2.12) (1.97) (1.97) (1.97) (1.99) (1.99) (2.11) (2.11) 
CY -0.92 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -1.03 -1.02 
 (-1.07) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.15) (-1.14) 
CZ 4.58*** 4.60*** 4.69*** 4.69*** 4.70*** 4.70*** 5.06*** 5.08*** 
 (7.20) (7.22) (7.30) (7.30) (7.31) (7.31) (7.53) (7.54) 
DE 2.05*** 2.07*** 2.09*** 2.09*** 2.09*** 2.09*** 2.28*** 2.29*** 
 (3.84) (3.86) (3.88) (3.88) (3.89) (3.89) (4.03) (4.04) 
DK 2.92*** 2.95*** 2.99*** 2.99*** 2.99*** 2.99*** 3.24*** 3.25*** 
 (5.44) (5.48) (5.52) (5.52) (5.53) (5.53) (5.69) (5.70) 
ES 3.54*** 3.57*** 3.63*** 3.63*** 3.64*** 3.64*** 3.93*** 3.94*** 
 (6.39) (6.43) (6.49) (6.50) (6.50) (6.50) (6.68) (6.69) 
EE 3.98*** 4.00*** 4.08*** 4.08*** 4.09*** 4.09*** 4.42*** 4.43*** 
 (6.85) (6.86) (6.93) (6.93) (6.95) (6.95) (7.14) (7.16) 
FI omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
FR 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.88 
 (1.35) (1.36) (1.36) (1.36) (1.36) (1.36) (1.43) (1.43) 
EL -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -1.69 -1.69 -1.81 -1.81 
 (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.58) (-1.58) 
HU -1.63 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 -1.78 -1.78 
 (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.55) (-1.55) 
IE 2.51*** 2.54*** 2.57*** 2.57*** 2.57*** 2.57*** 2.79*** 2.80*** 
 (4.72) (4.75) (4.78) (4.79) (4.79) (4.79) (4.95) (4.96) 
IT reference reference reference reference reference reference reference reference 
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LV 0.96* 0.95* 0.96* 0.96* 0.96* 0.96* 1.06* 1.06* 
 (1.68) (1.65) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.74) (1.74) 
LT -0.49 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.57 -0.57 
 (-0.65) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.72) (-0.71) 
LU omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
           
MT 0.96* 0.95* 0.96* 0.96* 0.96* 0.96* 1.06* 1.06* 
 (1.68) (1.65) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.74) (1.74) 
NL 5.38*** 5.43*** 5.52*** 5.53*** 5.53*** 5.53*** 5.91*** 5.93*** 
 (7.13) (7.18) (7.26) (7.26) (7.27) (7.27) (7.51) (7.52) 
PL -0.92 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -1.03 -1.02 
 (-1.07) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.15) (-1.14) 
PT 3.45*** 3.49*** 3.54*** 3.54*** 3.55*** 3.55*** 3.83*** 3.84*** 
 (6.27) (6.31) (6.37) (6.38) (6.38) (6.38) (6.56) (6.57) 
RO 6.24*** 6.18*** 6.27*** 6.28*** 6.30*** 6.30*** 6.60*** 6.62*** 
 (5.61) (5.55) (5.61) (5.62) (5.63) (5.63) (5.80) (5.81) 
SI -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.23 
 (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.31) 
SK 3.30*** 3.31*** 3.36*** 3.36*** 3.37*** 3.37*** 3.65*** 3.66*** 
 (6.01) (6.01) (6.07) (6.07) (6.08) (6.09) (6.26) (6.28) 
SE 4.46*** 4.51*** 4.58*** 4.59*** 4.59*** 4.60*** 4.94*** 4.95*** 
 (7.24) (7.29) (7.36) (7.37) (7.37) (7.38) (7.57) (7.59) 
UK 5.07*** 5.12*** 5.21*** 5.22*** 5.22*** 5.22*** 5.59*** 5.61*** 
 (7.28) (7.33) (7.41) (7.41) (7.42) (7.42) (7.64) (7.66) 
HR 4.81*** 4.50*** 4.59*** 4.57*** 4.54*** 4.53*** 4.89*** 4.90*** 
  (4.21) (3.92) (3.99) (3.97) (3.94) (3.94) (4.18) (4.19) 
Time trend 
Year   0.07*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.07** 
   (3.03) (2.33) (2.25) (2.25) (2.22) (2.24) (2.13) 
GE crop’s use 
Import    -0.28 -0.30* -0.35* -0.34* -0.05 -0.05 
    (-1.54) (-1.65) (-1.87) (-1.81) (-0.27) (-0.26) 
Food, feed    reference reference reference reference reference reference 
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Cultivation    -1.31*** -1.33*** -1.41*** -1.39*** -1.93*** -1.85*** 
    (-4.15) (-3.94) (-4.11) (-4.02) (-4.50) (-4.30) 
Trait multiple 
multiple      -0.22 -0.23 -0.12 -0.19 
      (-1.27) (-1.28) (-0.63) (-0.90) 
single      reference reference reference reference 
           
Type of GE trait 
Herbicide tolerance     0.09 0.15 0.15  0.29 
     (0.47) (0.78) (0.78)  (1.31) 
Insect resistance     reference reference reference  reference 
           
Other     0.16 0.18 0.18  -0.15 
     (0.65) (0.74) (0.73)  (-0.44) 
Developer's domicile 
Foreign (ex-Europe)       0.05 0.22 0.20 
       (0.34) (1.18) (1.10) 
Domestic (European)       reference reference reference 
           
Plant type 
Cotton        -1.98*** -1.87** 
        (-2.71) (-2.54) 
Flower        0.96 1.42 
        (1.03) (1.43) 
Maize        -1.73*** -1.60** 
        (-2.59) (-2.37) 
Oilseed rape        -2.71*** -2.60*** 
        (-3.96) (-3.73) 
Potato        0.02 0.38 
        (0.02) (0.41) 
Rice        0.94 0.95 
        (1.01) (1.02) 
Soybean        -1.79** -1.64** 
        (-2.56) (-2.34) 
Sugarbeet        omitted omitted 
           
 Constant -2.42*** -148.34*** -119.00** -115.72** -116.11** -114.99** -139.27** -135.02** 
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  (-5.18) (-3.07) (-2.38) (-2.29) (-2.30) (-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.16) 
 Pseudo R² 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.49 
  Observations 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 
 
Note: Robust z-n parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. Dependent variable is the likelihood of "for" vote at SCOFCAH. 
 
34 
 
Table 5. The absolute and relative frequency (%) with which MSs opposed (voted ‘against’, ‘abstain’, 
or were absent) the authorization of a GE crop at the SCFCAH and the C/AC from 2003 to 2014. 
Period MS (relative vote 
weight (%)) 
Voting Body 
SCFCAH (2003-2014) C/AC (2004-2015) 
MS’s Vote/No.  of 
Ballots 
Frequency (%) MS’s Vote/No.  of 
Ballots 
Frequency (%) 
1. 
EU15: 
01.01.1995 -
30.04. 2004 
Germany (11.49) 3/3 100,0  
No voting took place France (11.49) 1/3 33,3 
Italy (11.49) 2/3 66,7 
Spain (9.20) 1/3 33,3 
2. 
 
 
 
EU25: 
 
01.05.2004 - 
31.10.2004 
 
Germany (8.06) 1/1 100,0 6/8 75,0 
France (8.06)   2/8 25,0 
Italy (8.06) 1/1 100,0 7/8 87,5 
UK (8.06) 1/1 100,0 1/8 12,5 
Poland (6.45)   4/8 50,0 
Spain (6.45) 1/1 100,0 8/8 100,0 
Belgium (4.03)   4/8 50,0 
Czech Rep. (4.03)   2/8 25,0 
Greece (4.03) 1/1 100,0 8/8 100,0 
Hungary (4.03) 1/1 100,0 4/8 50,0 
Portugal (4.03) 1/1 100,0 6/8 75,0 
Austria (3.23)   2/8 25,0 
Denmark (2.42)   1/8 12,5 
Luxemburg (1.61)   1/8 12,5 
3. 
 
 
EU25: 
 
01.11.2004 -  
31.12.2006 
Germany (9,03) 5/10 50,0 1/5 20,0 
France (9,03) 2/10 20,0   
Italy (9,03) 10/10 100,0 5/5 100,0 
UK (9,03)   3/5 60,0 
Poland (8,41) 8/10 80,0 5/5 100,0 
Spain (8,41) 9/10 90,0 5/5 100,0 
Belgium (3,74) 1/10 10,0 1/5 20,0 
Czech Rep. (3,74) 4/10 40,0 1/5 20,0 
Greece (3,74) 7/10 70,0 2/5 40,0 
Hungary (3,74) 7/10 70,0 2/5 40,0 
Portugal (3,74) 4/10 40,0 2/5 40,0 
Austria (3,12) 3/10 30,0   
Sweden (3,12) 3/10 30,0   
4. 
 
 
EU27: 
 
01.01.2007 - 
30.06.2013 
Germany (8,41) 17/36 47,2 10/31 32,3 
France (8,41) 35/36 97,2 29/31 93,5 
Italy (8,41) 32/36 88,9 29/31 93,5 
UK (8,41) 3/36 8,3 3/31 9,7 
Poland (7,83) 35/36 97,2 30/31 96,8 
Spain (7,83)   5/31 16,1 
Romania (4,06) 1/36 2,8 2/31 6,5 
Netherlands (3,77) 2/36 5,6   
Belgium (3,48) 4/36 11,1   
Czech Rep. (3,48) 2/36 5,6   
Greece (3,48) 6/36 16,7 5/31 16,1 
Hungary (3,48) 6/36 16,7 5/31 16,1 
Portugal (3,48) 5/36 13,9 5/31 16,1 
5. 
EU28: 
 
01.07.2013 – 
31.10.2013 
 
Germany (8,24) 9/9 100,0 9/9 100,0 
France (8,24) 9/9 100,0 9/9 100,0 
Italy (8,24) 9/9 100,0 9/9 100,0 
Poland (7,67) 9/9 100,0 9/9 100,0 
Greece (3,41) 3/9 33,3   
Hungary (3,41) 3/9 33,3   
6. EU281: 
From 
01.11.2013 
Germany (15,93) 1/1 100,0 4/4 100,0 
France (12,98) 1/1 100,0 4/4 100,0 
Italy (11,81)   3/4 75,0 
1 Vote weights in this category are percentages. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1. SCFCAH’s voting results (‘for’, ‘against’) according to each MS’s weight, and the 
minimum additional number of votes required for reaching a qualified majority for authorizing GE 
crops for votes from December 2003 to September 2014 in the EU. 
Plant Event Votes ‘For’ Votes 
‘Against’ 
Additional 
votes 
required 
for a QM 
Number Per cent of 
maximum 
possible 
Per cent of 
QM 
Results for EU-15 until April 2004, maximum possible votes = 87 
Maize Bt11 33 37.9 53.2 25 29 
Maize NK603 53 60.9 85.5 20 9 
Maize NK603 50 57.5 80.6 15 12 
Results for EU-25 from May - November 2004, maximum possible votes = 124 
Rapeseed GT73 43 34.7 48.9 57 45 
Results for EU-25 from November 2004 – December 2006, maximum possible votes = 321 
Maize GA21 98 30.5 42.2 62 134 
Maize 1507 116 36.1 50.0 92 116 
Maize MON863 175 54.5 75.4 52 57 
Maize 1507 111 34.6 47.8 76 121 
Maize MON863xMON810 94 29.3 40.5 45 138 
Rapeseed Ms8 102 31.8 44.0 151 130 
Rapeseed Rf3 102 31.8 44.0 151 130 
Rapeseed Ms8xRf3 102 31.8 44.0 151 130 
Flowers Carnation Moonlite 123.2.38 196 61.1 84.5 49 36 
Potato EH92-527-2 134 41.7 57.8 80 98 
Results for EU-27 from January 2007 – June 2013, maximum possible votes = 345 
Sugarbeet H7-1 195 56.5 76.5 92 60 
Maize 59122 197 57.1 77.3 79 58 
Potato EH92-527-2 123 35.7 48.2 104 132 
Maize MON863xMON810xNK603 149 43.2 58.4 90 106 
Maize MON863xMON810 149 43.2 58.4 90 106 
Maize MON863xNK603 149 43.2 58.4 90 106 
Maize GA21 155 44.9 60.8 65 100 
Rapeseed T45 146 42.3 57.3 138 109 
Soybean MON89788 160 46.4 62.7 69 95 
Maize 1507 91 26.4 35.7 127 164 
Maize Bt11 91 26.4 35.7 127 164 
Maize MON88017 167 48.4 65.5 84 88 
Maize MIR604 138 40.0 54.1 99 117 
Maize 1507x59122 183 53.0 71.8 83 72 
Maize 59122x1507xNK603 183 53.0 71.8 83 72 
Maize MON88017xMON810 183 53.0 71.8 83 72 
Maize Bt11 (renewal) 167 48.4 65.5 84 88 
Maize MON89034xNK603 164 47.5 64.3 116 91 
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Maize Bt11xGA21 164 47.5 64.3 87 91 
Rice LLRICE601 256 74.2 100.4 0 -1 
Cotton GHB 614 157 45.5 61.6 106 98 
Maize 1507 183 53.0 71.8 73 72 
Maize MON89034xMON88017 154 44.6 60.4 109 101 
Cotton 281-24-236x3006-210-23 192 55.7 75.3 87 63 
Maize Bt11xMIR604xGA21 180 52.2 70.6 109 75 
Maize MIR604xGA21 180 52.2 70.6 109 75 
Maize Bt11xMIR604 180 52.2 70.6 99 75 
Soybean 40-3-2 (renewal) 190 55.1 74.5 80 65 
Soybean A5547-127 190 55.1 74.5 113 65 
Soybean 356043 181 52.5 71.0 84 74 
Soybean MON87701 181 52.5 71.0 94 74 
Soybean MON87701xMON89788 149 43.2 58.4 87 106 
Maize MIR162 152 44.1 59.6 96 103 
Maize MON89034x1507xMON88017x59122 158 45,8 62,0 116 97 
Maize MON89034x1507xNK603 158 45,8 62,0 116 97 
Results for EU-28 from July 2013 - October 2014, maximum possible votes = 352 
Oilseed rape GT73 161 45,7 61,9 103 99 
Maize T25 149 42,3 57,3 94 111 
Soybean MON87707 (dicamba) 152 43,2 58,5 101 108 
Soybean 305423 161 45,7 61,9 126 99 
Soybean MON87705 149 42,3 57,3 133 111 
Soybean MON87708 149 42,3 57,3 104 111 
Soybean BPS-CV127-9 149 42,3 57,3 104 111 
Maize NK603 161 45,7 61,9 97 99 
Cotton LLcotton25xGHB614 144 40,9 55,4 130 116 
Oilseed rape MON88302 140 39,8 53,8 123 120 
Cotton MON89913 140 39,8 53,8 123 120 
Results for EU-28 from November 2014, double majority voting; maximum possible votes = 100 
Soybean MON87769 37,9 37,8 58,2 30,5 27,15 
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Table A2. C/AC’s voting results (‘for’, ‘against’) according to each EU MS’s weight, and the 
minimum additional number of votes required for reaching a qualified majority for authorizing GE 
crops for votes from 2004 to 2015. 
Plant Event Votes ‘For’ Votes 
‘Against’ 
Votes required for a 
qualified majority 
Number 
 
Per cent of 
maximum 
possible 
Per cent of 
QM 
Results for EU-25 from May - November 2004, maximum possible votes = 124 
Maize Bt11 35 28.2 39.8 29 53 
Maize NK603 53 42.7 60.2 39 35 
Maize NK603 48 38.7 54.5 36 40 
Oilseed rape GT73 30 24.2 34.1 55 58 
Maize MON863 50 40.3 56.8 47 38 
Maize 1507 45 36.3 51.1 47 43 
Maize GA21 37 29.8 42.0 58 51 
Maize MON863 55 44.4 62.5 45 33 
Results for EU-25 from November 2004 – December 2006, maximum possible votes = 321 
Maize MON863xMON810 133 41.4 57.3 142 99 
Maize 1507 111 34.6 47.8 81 121 
Oilseed rape Ms8 124 38.6 53.4 151 108 
Oilseed rape Ms8xRf3 124 38.6 53.4 151 108 
Oilseed rape Rf3 124 38.6 53.4 151 108 
Results for EU-27 from January 2007 – June 2013, maximum possible votes = 345 
Flower Carnation Moonlite 123.2.38 212 61.4 83.1 90 43 
Potato EH92-527-2 130 37.7 51.0 119 125 
Potato EH92-527-2 114 33.0 44.7 173 141 
Maize MON863xMON810xNK603 145 42.0 56.9 119 110 
Maize MON863xMON810 145 42.0 56.9 119 110 
Maize MON863xNK603 145 42.0 56.9 119 110 
Maize GA21 128 37.1 50.2 90 127 
Cotton LL25 186 53.9 72.9 109 69 
Soybean A2704-12 174 50.4 68.2 109 81 
Soybean MON89788 164 47.5 64.3 79 91 
Maize MON88017 167 48.4 65.5 84 88 
Maize MIR604 181 52.5 71.0 128 74 
Maize Bt11 (renewal) 167 48.4 65.5 84 88 
Maize Bt11xGA21 164 47.5 64.3 87 91 
Maize MON89034xNK603 164 47.5 64.3 116 91 
Maize MON89017xMON810 183 53.0 71.8 112 72 
Maize 59122x1507xNK603 183 53.0 71.8 112 72 
Maize 1507x59122 183 53.0 71.8 112 72 
Maize 1507 186 53.9 72.9 109 69 
Cotton GHB 614 193 55.9 75.7 106 62 
Maize MON89034xMON88017 190 55.1 74.5 109 65 
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Cotton 281-24-236x3006-210-23 163 47.2 63.9 87 92 
Maize Bt11xMIR604xGA21 151 43.8 59.2 109 104 
Maize MIR604xGA21 151 43.8 59.2 109 104 
Maize Bt11xMIR604 151 43.8 59.2 99 104 
Soybean 40-3-2 181 52.5 71.0 80 74 
Soybean A5547-127 181 52.5 71.0 113 74 
Soybean 356043 181 52.5 71.0 94 74 
Soybean MON87701 181 52.5 71.0 96 74 
Soybean MON87701xMON89789 149 43.2 58.4 87 106 
Maize MIR162 152 44.1 59.6 96 103 
Results for EU-28 from July 2013 - October 2014, maximum possible votes = 352 
Maize MON89034x1507xMON880
17x59122 
161 45,7 61,9 123 99 
Maize MON89034x1507xNK603 161 45,7 61,9 123 99 
Oilseed rape GT73 164 46,6 63,1 101 96 
Soybean 305423 161 45,7 61,9 103 99 
Soybean MON87705 161 45,7 61,9 110 99 
Soybean MON87708 149 42,3 57,3 81 111 
Soybean BPS-CV127-9 161 45,7 61,9 81 99 
Maize T25 161 45,7 61,9 103 99 
Maize NK603 161 45,7 61,9 97 99 
Results for EU-28 from November 2014, double majority voting; maximum possible votes = 100 
Cotton LLcotton25xGHB614 29,6 29,6 45,5 61,2 35,4 
Cotton MON89913 29,6 29,6 45,5 61,2 35,4 
Oilseed rape MON88302 29,6 29,6 45,5 61,2 35,4 
Soybean MON87769 38,9 38,9 59,8 61,2 26,1 
 
 
